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This thesis describes the applicaticn of coirputer
simulation techniques to auditing a military payroll system.
After review of the system, a simulation model was
constructed to assist the auditor during the preliminary
evaluation in establishing threshold limits for internal
control compliance. The model describes potential errors
and irregularities that could occur, their probability of
occurrence, and the internal controls that should prevent or
detect those errorfe. Given the probability of various
errors and the internal control compliance rates, the model
generates the expected value and standaird deviation of the
error in the system putput data. This output data serves as
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Section 320 of Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1
contains the following outline of an approach for evaluating
internal control:
A conceptually logical approach to the
auditor's evaluation of accounting control, which
focuses directly on the purpose of preventing or
detecting material errors and irregularities in
financial statements, is to apply the following
steps in considering each significant class of
transactions aiid related assets involved in the
audit:
a^ Consider the types of errors and
irregularities that could occur.
b. Determine the accounting control procedures
that should prevent or detect such errors and
irregularities.
c. Eetermine whether the necessary procedures ace
prescribed and are being followed satisfactorily.
d. Evaluate any weaknesses (i.e., types of
potential errors and irregularities not covered by
existing control procedures) to determine their
effect on (1) the nature, timing, or extent of
auditing procedures to be applied and (2)
suggestions to be made to the client.
i
Although this outline is tailored to the specific
requirements of a final evaluation of internal controls
(i.e., the evaluation performed siibseguent to compliance
* Coaimittee on Auditing Procedures, Statemont of Auditincj
•Standards #JI, American Institute of Zjtiltilie'a "TuIIIc




paragraph 54 of section 320 recommends that the
same basic approach be employed for a "preliminary"
evaluation of internal controls.
Preliminary evaluations are normally performed
immediately after prescribed internal controls are reviewed
but before compliance tests are designed and performed. The
major purposes of a preliminary evaluation are threefold:
1. lo identify obvious strengths and weaknesses in
prescribed accountiag controls which could have a bearing on
the audit program ultimately applied.
2. To develop a tentative audit strategy of compliance
tests and substantive procedures early in the audit.
3. lo establish upper precision limits (i.e., tolerable
error rates) for compliance tests compatible with this
tentative audit program.
B. PEELIHIN&EY EVALUATION PHOBLEHS
Inplecentation difficulties often arise when the section
320 evaluation approach is employed to perform an evaluation
of an extensive system of internal conti^ols. Many systems
requiring a total system approach involve the processing of
several different classes of transactions. Such systems are
often composed of a multitude of interrelated internal
controls. Under these circumstances, it is often difficult
to assess the potential financial statement impact of each
control, and even more difficult to assess the potential
joint impact of all controls. When internal controls
operate in either a joint or feedback fashion, as they often
do in inventory or payroll systems, conceptual evaluation of
the system can become hopelessly complex. As a result,
several accounting researchers have set out to develop
analytical methods to assist the auditor in evaluating
complex internal control systems. Thus far, the following
three methods have been proposed:




2. A statistical modeling approach based on the
concepts of reliability engineering proposed by Professor
Gushing.
3
3. A Konte Carlp computer simulation technique proposed
by Professor Burns.*
To date none of these approaches has been applied to
evaluate an actual system.
C. PURPOSE
This thesis illustrates a practical application of the
computer simulation evaluation method proposed by Burns. It
describes how computer simulation was employed to perform a
joint preliminary £valuation of all pertinent accounting
controls reJ^ated to a real world payroll system.
The approach proposed by Professors Yu and Neter was not
selected for this thesis because: (a) their approach fails
to consider the detailed characteristics of any errors
cpnsidered possible in the circumstances and (b) it fails to
consider the potential dollar impact of possible errors and
irregularities on the financial accounts.
Professor Cushing's approach was not selected because:
(a) it does not distinguish between an error free system and
a system plagued by offsetting errors and (b) it is not well
suited to evaluations of systems which encompass several
different types of exrors.
2Yu- S. and Neter, J., A Stochastic, Model cf^tne
Internal_Control_S_ystejn , Faculty HoFlcIng Papers, CoTlGOe"" of
'C'^miaerce ' and Business Administration, University of
Illinois, Urtana-Charapaign, 17 April, 1973.
^Gushing, B. E. "A Mathematical Approach to the Analysis
and Design or Internal Control Systems," Accounting Hcviow,




Controls^, paper presented at r;i'awT5slE~I<ugioiiaI Conleieiice'SI
'Rmetxcau Institute for Decision Sciences, 5th, Minneapolis,
.Minnesota, 10-11 May 1974.
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The Konte Carlo technique was chosen because it can be:
(a) Adapted to a wide variety of actual system structures.
(b) Used to represent most of the probabilistic error
processes ifhich are found in real world systems. (c)
Adapted to represent complex accQunting control/error
interrelationships and feedback processes.
D. METHCEOLCGY
The Konte Carlp approach was applied to an actual
payroll system which pays approximately 1700 personnel twice
a month. An internal control review was perforiEed to
identify all pertinent prescribed controls. Controls were
observed that dc not leave an audit trail. A document
flowchart of this payroll system is presented as figure 1.
A preliminary evaluation of the payroll system was then
perforsed using gomputer simulation as an audit tool. The
four step evaluation approach quoted previously was employed
as folloKs:
1. Consideration was given to the various types of
errors and irregularities which might occur. The writers
were of the opinion that six basic types of errors were
possible. These potential errors were identified and
quantitatively defined so that they could be incorporated in
the sitrulaticn program.
2. Consideration was given to the accounting control
procedures that could prevent or detect the six types of
errors believed possible.
3. Pertinent ££Sscribed accounting controls were
identified pending further clarification by simulation
testing. These controls ware incorporated in the design of
the siculaticn model.
U. A computer simulation model of the six error
processes and pertinent prescribed controls was constructed.
This i.odel was used to enuicerato the total dcllai: amount of
undetected error w]iich might be generated by the system (as
12

conceptualized by the writers) over one pay period (one half
month) . The model «as tested using various error rates and






























il- THE PAYROL). SYSTEM
a. DESCRIPTION
The payroll system selected is representative of many
found in the business community. Each individual's
authorized rate of pay, withholding information, and other
data concerning payroll deductions are maintained on a
permanent employee "pay record" card. Changes in this
information are received with appropriate authorization from
the personnel office. Prior to each payday, these changes
are entered on the pay record as reguired and each
employee's pay for the period is calculated. As each
payroll is prepared, the amount paid is entered
simultaneously on the pay record, the payroll check and a
"money list" (listing by name of each employee and his
authorized pay) . After the payroll checks are prepared,
they are machine signed and either distributed by authorized
personnel or mailed directly to the employee's bank. A
detailed narrative description of the payroll system appears
in Appendix A.
B. POTEKTIAl ERRORS AND IRREGULARITIES
All errors believed possible in the case of the payroll
system uere grouped into six major categories. Each error
category was treated as a separate stochastic process of the
model. A detailed description of these errors and
irregularities appears in Appendix B.
An impression was formulated as to occurrence rate and
dollar magnitude of each category of error. To provide the
maximum credible quantitative system error, pessimistic
values were assigned to these occurrence rates and error
magnitudes. The six major categories of errors and their
assigned statistical properties are as follows:
15

1. iD put Document Errors
Payroll record change documents received ty the
payroll department from the personnel department could
cgntain monetary errors, non-monetary errors, or both.
These errors range from lack of authorizing signature and
incorrect social secaarity numbers to erroneous pay rates and
tax exemptions. It was the writers' impression that these
types of errors cpuld lead to monetary errors in nc more
than 15 out of every 100 documents processed. It uas the
writers' further impression that the dollar magnitude of
such errors might be normally distributed. It was decided
that the mean dollar value of such errors would not exceed




Tam per in g_ Erroy
Any changes to a pay record which are not supported
by documentation from the personnel department are
considered here tc be "pay record tampering error". In the
case of the subject system, this type of error could arise
in two ways. The employee could gain either direct or
indirect access (i.e., by collusion) to his pay record and
alter it to reflect a higher pay schedule. A payroll clerk
or payroll supervisor could alter his own pay record in a
similar fashion. A pessimistic occurrence rate of 5 in 1000
records processed was assigned to this type of error. A
high occurrence rate was assigned to this error process in
order to reflect the undesirable gualitative aspects of this
type of intentional error in the model. Since an abnormally
high increase in pay would probably be detected bj the
system, a mean value of $200,00 and a standard deviation of
$50.00 was defined as the magnitude of this type error.
3- Calculation .Error
Prior to each payday, a payroll clerk calculates the
16

amount due each employee. The clerk uses the information on
the pay record for this calculation. The process involves
determination of the gross pay due the employee. Then
adjustments are made to this gross pay figure for PICA,
income taxes, and other deductions either required by law or
authorized by the employee. During this process, various
tables are consulted and several numeric calculations are
performed. At any point, the clerk could make a computation
error. An occurrence rate of 10 errors per hundred records
was defined for this type of error. The expected dollar
value of this error was set at 5 percent of the base pay.
^ . Becor d Inclusion/Exclusion
,
Error
Sinc€ there is a turnover in employees between
paydays, there exists the possibility that a pay record
could be included ox excluded incorrectly from the payroll.
Errors of this type would probably result from a breakdown
of the internal communication system within the organization
or through an intentional defalcation. If new employee pay
records are not delivered to the payroll department iu a
timely manner, the employee will not be paid on time.
Upon leaving, an employee is paid and his pay record is
removed from the system. If, however, an employee neglected
to collect his terminating pay, his pay record could remain
in the payroll system for some time. It was the
investigators' impression that this type of error could
occur one time in 100 and that the ratio of errors of
excJLusion tc errors of inclusion might be 3 to 1. The
dollar magnitude of these errors depended uppn the specific
payroll record involved. Payroll record data was fed to the
model as an external input.
5- Clerical E rror
An HCE class 33 accounting machine is used to print
simultaneously the dollar value on the pay record, money
list, and the check. During the keying process, the machine
17

operator could inadvertantly transpose two digits. An
occurrence rate of 10 out of each 100 documents processed
was assigned to this type of error. The error was defined
to be norcally distributed with a mean of $0.00 and a
standard deviation of $100.00,
6 • Def alcatio n
Defalcations could occur in the payroll department.
Payroll clerks could introduce bogus pay records intc the
system and cash the checks drawn to those bogus pay records
or simply steal blanJc checks and process them through the
check signing machine or forge the disbursing officer's
signature. An occurrence rate of 1 out of 1000 records
processed was assigned to this type of error. It was
further determined tiat the magnitude of this error might be
normally distributed with an expected value of $2000.00 and
a standard deviation of $1000.00. Negative defalcations
were not allowed. Again, a high occurrence rate was
assigned to this type of error in order to reflect the
undesirable gualitative aspects of an intentional
defalcaticn-
C. PERTINENI ACCOUNTING CONTROLS
Integral to the payroll system are a set of internal
controls designed to either prevent or detect and correct
the errors discussed in the previous section. Some of these
controls leave an objective audit trail while others are
either of a safeguard nature or of a review nature which
conseguently leave no such audit trail. Examination of the
system led to the identification of seven discrete groups of
pertinent controls. Each group was treated as a single
control for the purpose of the model". These controls are as
follows:
"•
• Inpu t Document Controls
10

As each payroll change document is received from the
personnel department it is reviewed for reasonableness and
authority and edited for obvious clerical errors. This
review process should detect and correct most obvious
administrative and clerical errors committed within the
personnel department. However, a document authorizing the
modification of the wrong pay record would probably not be
detected by this control. Also, it is unlikely that the
control would detect a fraudulent change notice which
contained a valid authorizing signature. It was the
investigators' impression that these controls might be 80
percent effective in detecting input document errors.
2, PaVFecord Tampering Controls
These controls leave no objective audit trail.
However, they do .provide a series of safeguards which are
designed to discourage and prevent tampering with pay
records. These safeguards consist of variqus policies and
operating procedures designed to restrict access to the pay
records. Positive control is maintained over both active
pay records and blank pay record cards. Clerks are rotated
in their duties to prevent the permanent introduction of a
bogus cecord.
No violations of these safeguards were noted during the
physical observation of the payroll system. However^
management's ability to detect such violations appeared
quite weak. It uas the writers' opinion that these controls
might be only 50 percent effective in preventing or
detecting payroll ta.mpering errors if such tampering did
occur.
3. Eayroll Inclusiopy/ExcJcUsion ^Controls
An employee, upon leaving the organization, is given
a check-out form which is to be initialed by various
departmental personnel. l.'hen this form is presented by the
employee to the payroll department, tlie payroll clerk
19

initials the form and removes the pay record from the
system. Periodically a listing of all employees is sent to
the payroll department to provide verification of the pay
records. To a great extent these controls rely upon the
individual employee's desire to receive severance pay. It
was the writers' impression that this control might be 95
percent effective in preventing improper payroll inclusion
or exclusion errors.
^ • Calculatio n Controls
The amount due the employee is calculated and then
entered in the pay record as a penciled marginal note. The
payroll clerk compares the most recent marginal note to
previous payments in order to detect any significant changes
in pay due the employee. If there is a significant change,
the clerk is supposed to satisfy himself as to the reason
for the difference. Clerks are rotated periodically to
increase the effectiveness of this control. In the opinion
of the investigators^ it seemed likely that this control





Adding machine tapes of the individual checks, the
money list, and pay record entries are prepared by a payroll
clerk. These tapes are verified for accuracy by two clerks.
It was the writers' impression that this control should
detect and correct 95 percent of the errors resulting from
erroneous keying on the NCR machine.
6 Defalcation Controls
These contrpls consist of a series of safeguards
designed tc discourage or prevent a payroll defalcation.
Standard procedures are used such as insuring annual
vacations of all clerks, rotation of the various duties
among several clerks, and periodic transfer of personnel to
20

other payroll departments. Every six months the pay records
are closed out and aent to a central office for auditing and
.in addition, each year there is a detailed local audit of
the system conducted. Safeguards in the system would, in
general, prevent the systematic defalcation of relatively
small amounts over a long period of time. However, there
does exist the possibility of a material one time
defalcation by creating a high dollar value bogus check.
The impression of the investigators was that the efficiency
of this control might be as low as 80 percent in preventing
such a defalcation.
7 . External__ Control
Most employees* perceptions of the payroll system
lead them to the belief that an over payment of salary will
ultimately be detected and withheld from their future pay.
This results in aii external control on the system. For
purposes of the simuilation model, it was assumed that 85
percent of the employees are honest if the error results in
an over payment and .100 percent honest if the error results
in under payment. Of the 15 percent who might not return an
over payment, it was further assumed that as the magnitude
of the ever payment increased the probability of check
return also increased. A maximum acceptable overpayment was








The payroll simulation program is written in Fortran IV.
The basic program logic is flowcharted in Figure 2. As
Figure 2 illustrates, the basic program logic is divided
into seven stages. The first six stages correspond to
separate payroll processing steps where an error is believed
possible. The seventh stage represents the external control
process discussed eaxlier. The program stages are organized
to follow the logical processing flow of the payroll system.
Internal control processes are incorporated in the program
at their proper positions. The program is designed to
proceed through all seven stages one payroll record at a
time.
At each program stage, the question is asked, "did an
error occur in performing this operation on this payroll
record?" The program answers this question
probabilistically by selecting a psuedo-random number from
the randciE number generator and comparing this random number
to a previously defined error occurrence rate. If this
random nutrber comparison does not trigger the occurrence of
the errcr, the simulation prcg^ram proceeds to the next
stage. If the error is triggered, the program branches to a
relevant control process to further determine whether or not
the prescribed control will detect and correct (or prevent
the occurrence of) the error in question. Internal control
failures are triggered probabilistically by a random number
process similar to that described above for the error
process. If the control does not fail, the program branches
to the next stage. If the control fails, the program
calculates the dollar error based on a predefined rule. Tlie
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After passing through the program, 1 is added to a
counter. The value in the counter is compared with a
predefined number (in this case 1700, the number of
employees included in the payroll) . If the counter does not
equal the total number of payroll records to be processed,
the cycle is repeated until the number of passes through the
program is egual to the number of checks processed for a
payday. The sum pf all the errors, which have been
accumulated, represents the total error present on the first
payday. The process is repeated and the total error for the
second payday results. The process is repeated again. The
result is a string of values each representing a potential
total dollar amount of error which might occur in processing
1700 payroll records. At any point, the mean and standard
deviation of the string of error values can be calculated.
B. OPERATING CHAfiACTERISTICS AND OUTPUT
1 . Bandcm Numbers
The simulation program calls a library sub-routine
which generates uniformly distributed psuedo-random numbers.
The sequence of xandcm numbers generated is uniquely
determined by a user specified "seed" number. Once the
"seed" number: is specified, the random number sequence is
determined and can be duplicated during subsequent coirputer
runs. Twc types of random number sequences were used:
a. Uniformly distributed random numbers with values
beween ^^^ 1 were .used with the probabilities to determine
if a specific branch was taken. For example, assume a
probability of .6 was assigned to an event. A random
number X would be called. If the random number X were
greater than .6, then the event did not occur and the tranch
was not taken.
b. Normally distributed random numbers about with
a standard deviation of 1 (standard deviate) were used to
24

compute most monetary errors. For example, a normally
distributed random number X is called. The dollar error is
then calculated by multiplying X by S (sample standard
deviation) and adding the result to U {mean dollar error)
.
2. Verificati on Of Program
The logic of the program was tested using techniques
suggested by Conway, Johnson, and Maxwell. The model was
"broken down into a set of elements for which operating
rules can be given. "^ Each element was subjected to a
series of tests to determine if the element was behaving in
accordance with the writers' wishes. These tests involved
selection of input parameters and the verification of output
by manual offline methods. For example, the document
input e;:rcr/control processes (PiGCl) were tested as an
element (see Figure 2 page 23) . The remaining elements
(P2^C2 through P6/C6 and C7) were blocked by setting P2
through F6 and C7 to 0.0. Input parameters were assigned to
the P1/C1 element and the output verified using a hand
calculator. The P1/C1 element was blocked by setting P1 at
0.0. The P2/C2 element was checked. This procedure was
repeated until all elements were verified.
3. Convergence of Output
Seventeen hi,indred payroll records were processed to
determine the dollar value error for a single payday (one
model iteration) . A moving average dollar error and
standard deviation was generated for 2,000 iterations.
Figure 3 is a display of the mean value as a function of the
number of iterations. As the graph shows, the change in the
mean dollar value becomes very small after three hundred
iterations. Any changes after that point are immaterial
^Conway, E. W. , Johnson. B. ii., and Maxwell, W. L.-,
"Some Prcblems or Digital System Simulation", lianaqement




from an audit staJidpoint " (i.e., they would not cause an
auditor to change his decision) . For the purpose of
subsequent analysis^ the values guoted for the mean and
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The authors had no computer program ining experience
prior tc constructing the payroll simulation model. The
preparation for the effort consisted of approximately five
hours study of a book on Fortran IV programuing. More time
was spent attempting to model the payroll system and develop
a logical series of events and steps than was spent in
actually writing the program. Three hours were spent coding
the logic in Fortran IV to convert the model into a computer
program. The program was then run on an IBM System 360,
Model 67 computer. Approximately 12 hours were spent
correcting keypunch and logical errors in the program. The
model was tested using simple data and the results were
verified by offline procedures. Once the simulation model
26

was verified to be operating properly, much time was spent
sensitivity testing the model. The analysis of the
sensitivity test results contributed to the writers' insight
concerning the impact of the combined effect of the error
and control processes. On many occasions, the mpdel
generated results that were counter-'intuitive but, on
























Input Document 15 in 100 80% $50.00 $50.00
Record Tamp. 5 in 1000 50% $200.00 $50.00
Calculation 10 in 100 95%
Becord In/Out 10 in 1000 95% 1 to 3*
Clerical 10 in 100 95% $0.00 $100.00
Defalcation 1 in 1000 80% $2000.00 $1000.00
Che9k Return 85% $0.00 $40.00
* ratio of extraneous recprd inclusion.
The values obtained from the model using the above
parameters were $1560.00 for the total mean net dollar error
and $1474.00 for the standard deviation of the net error.
It is important at this point to remember that the model
is not a codel of the real ststem but only a model cf the
auditor's imfressions concerning the pertinent error and
control frocesses of the system. Thus, the parameters used
to run the model are assumptions made by the writers based
on their impressions of the system. This thesis illustrates
how these imfressions can be enumerated over time in an
objective manner. The tjuestion of how these impressions are
formulated is beyond the scope of this thesis.
B. PESSIMISTIC CASE
tiqst auditors woAild bo interested in knowing what the
28

net dcllar error might be under the most pessiiristic
circumstances. The .writers tested this hypothesis using the





























Using the abcve input data, the total net dollar error
increased to $84,000 and the standard deviation of the net
error increased to $13,000. The total net dollar error
increased from less than one percent to over 11 percent of
the payroll dcllar v-alue.
C. SENSITIVITY OF MODEL
In view of the change noted when all values are placed
at the pessimistic case level, it was decided to investigate
the effect of changing one parameter at a time. As would be
expected, the error occurrence rate changes and control
effectiveness level jchanges did not all have the same effect
on the total system error. Figures 4 thru 9 show the effect
of increasing and decreasing the occurrence rates of
selected error processes from the base case levels. The
interesting fact here is that some of the error occurrence
rates have almost np effect on the mean total system error.
Any difference in error generated between the two values is
masked ty the random oscillations of the mean system error
about its liOiiting value. PI (probability of a document
error) is one such variable. One would think that this
29

error rate wculd tend to drive the total system error. It
does not. The model was very sensitive to changes in P6
(defalcation errors) . In this icstance, a change from no
defalcation to a rate of 20 in 100 records processed leads
to a $137,000 difference in error, which is to be expected
in view of the b4.as introduced into the model by a 20
percent defalcation rate.
Information about the sensitivity of the model to
changes in the various parameters provides valuable
information to the auditor when developing his audit
strategy. For example, the probability of document error,
PI, (see figure 4) has almost no effect on the total error
generated by the model. This information may lead the
auditor to modify his audit strategy from that which he
would have used if simulation techniques were not used. As
noted in section I. A (page 10), the above process will
support step 2 of the major purpose of a preliminary
evaluation. In addition, it will aid the auditor in
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D. GANGED INTERNAL CONTROL COMPLIANCE RATES
In order to study the over all model response to changes
in internal control effectiveness, all internal control
rates were varied from 0.0 (absolute ineffectiveness of
internal control) to 1.0 (absolute internal control
eff ectivenessj . Figures 10 and 11 display the relationship
between control effectiveness and the respective nieac and
standard deviation of the total net system error. The mean
appears to be almost linear with the control effectiveness
















V» SUMMARY. AND COMMENTS
This thesis has demonstrated the utility of the Monte
Carlo simulation technique to the preliminary evaluation of
internal controls in an audit engagement. Simulation forces
the auditor to systematize his thought process and quantify
his impressions concerning potential errors and pertinent
controls. It also permits the auditor to gain a more
thorough knowledge about the system and the
interrelationships of. its elements than he can obtain using
conceptual nethods. This approach provides a rational
method to establishing upper precision limits for compliance
testing. Sensitivity testing of such models can assist the
auditor in identifying material error processes and
pertinent cor.trol processes. In addition to identifying the
strengths and weaknesses for auditing purposes^ the
simulation model will highlight areas where helpful




DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM
A. THE OSNPGS MILITARY PAY SYSTEM
The heart of the pay system at the Postgraduate School
is the military disbursing office. The office is staffed
with a military Payroll Supervisor and three disbursing
clerks. The basic document controlling military pay is the
pay record.
Upon induction, enlistment, or commissioning in the
Navy, each individual has a pay record created giving the
pertinent information required to compute his periodic pay.
When transferred, the individual picks up his pay record and
proceeds to his duty station. Upon arriving at his new duty
station, the individual reports to the military personnel
office where his orders are endorsed. The endorsement
provides the reporting time and signature of an authorized
representative of ±he commanding officer. The individual
then delivers his pay record, detaching endorsement from the
previous command, and original orders with reporting
endorsement, to the jailitary disbursing office.
The disbursing office takes the pay record and creates a
metal plate from a Graphotype machine with name, social
security number, pay entry base date, active duty base date,
and other identifying data.
During the period the individual is attached to the
command, certain adjustments can be made to the pay record
to reflect a changed status. These changes reflect a
changed marital, dependency, rank or rate status cr other
pay record modifications. These changes are effected
through the receipt in the disbursing office of the
appropLiate authorizing document from the personnel office..
A certain category of changes can be made based on the
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data present in the pay record. The adjustment to base pay
based on longevity and PICA withholding will generate
changes to the pay record. No other supporting data is
regyired.
An additional <;ategory of changes can be requested
directly by the individual. In these cases, the individual
requests an addition/deletion or changes in an allotment on
a standard form which is then processed by the disbursing
officer.
The office performs the payroll function for the
following categories of personnel:
1. Naval and Cpast Guard students assigned to the
school for studies.
2. Military faculty members, staff personnel, and
qurricular officers.
3. Military personnel of the Navy Management Center.
4. Navy personnel attached to the Defense Language
Institute.
5. Naval personnel assigned to the Naval Aviation
Safety Center.
6. Military personnel of the Naval Reserve Center.
7. Military personnel of the Environmental Prediction
Research facility.
8. Military personnel of the Fleet Numerical Heather
Center.
9. Military personnel of the Navy Exchange.
10. Military personnel of the Naval Communications
Facility.
B. STEfS IN CREATIN.G THE PAYROLL
Paydays are on the 15th and 30th (last day for February)
of the nouth. The typical pay period covers 15 days. A
brief chronological sequence is as follows:
1. Approximately Qne week prior to the next payday, a
money list is created using the Graphotype plates referred
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to earlier. The ^ist provides name and social security
number for each indiividual to be paid.
' 2. Ihe payroll supervisor draws serialized blank checks
fron the disbursing .officer.
3. Using the Graphotype plates, the blank checks are
imprinted with names, social security numbers, and student
mail center (SHC) nuinbers (for personnel having SMC boxes) .
H. Ihe checks are given to the disbursing clerk
maintaining the pay records.
5. Ihe pay record, checks, and money list are inserted
into an NCE class 33 accounting machine and the amount of
pay due the individuals is printed on the cheqks, pay
records, and money list simultaneously.
6. The machine pperator from step 5 and an individual
who was net party to the woi;k performed in step 5 coupares
the aiBOunt on the check with the amount entered in the pay
record.
7. An adding machine tape is created from the checks
and attached to the money list.
8. a disbursing officer's signature plate and the key
to a Cummins Check Signer is obtained and the checks are
machine dated an.d signed. The check signing machine count
is compared with the number of checks to be issued.
9. Paychecks are distributed.
a. Checks that are to be mailed out are separated
and mailed.
b. Student checks are sorted by SHC number and
delivered to the student mail center at approximately 7:15
AM on payday. Mail clerks place the checks into the
corresponding boxes and the checks are ready for pickup by
the individuai at 8:00 AM.
c. Military faculty and staff checks are picked up
by office representatives who must sign for the checks or an
individual can pick up his own check.
d. Representatives from the other activities served
by the military disbursing office arrange to pick up their
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checks from the military disbursing office. A signed
receipt is required for checks distributed in this manner.
10. The money list and all voided checks are sent to
the NPGS Controller .(fiscal section) . They are subsequently
forwarded to the JJaval Regional Finance Center, Treasure
Island.





lEENTIFIClTION OF ERROBS AND IRREGULARITIES
Neter and Yu defined two types of errors in their study:
(1) monetary errors and (2) non-monetary errors. They
defined a monetary error to "include any error that can be
represented ty a $ sign. For example, errors in pay rate,
tax deductions, net pay and gross pay fall in this
category. "6 Ihey defined non-monetary errors to "include all
other errors such as errors in name, social security number,
work hours, etc."^ These same definitions have been adopted
for the purpose of this thesis. In evaluating internal
controls, the independent auditor is primarily interested in
determining the potential impact of any pqssible undetected
monetary errors on the financial accounts. A non-monetary
error, although a possible precursor for monetary error,
does net directly effect the financial accounts.
Non-monetary errors will not be considered explicitly in
this Appendix. Only those errors which have direct
financial impact will be discussed.
In the process of system operation, several types of
monetary errors can be introduced. For the purposes of this
paper, the monetary errors will be classified in two major
categories. The first category of monetary error is the
unintentional error. This category includes all those
errors which are introduced into the payroll system through
inattention or negligence on the part of the persons
operating the system: The second category of monetary error
is the intentional error. This category includes those
*Yu- S. and Meter, J.. A_Stochastic_KodGl cf the
Internal Con trol^S^stea, Faculty Wording Tapers, CSITeg"GT
romiiiei:ct~ ahl]" dusinerfs Administration- University of




errors hhich are introduced into the system with the full
knowledge cf the system operator (s) , The reasons the
operator may _ do so are manifold. They may range from
defalcation to an attempt to cover up a previous
unintentional error.
A. UNINTENTIONAL ERfiORS
During the payroll system evaluation, it was the
writers* impression -that unintentional monetary errors could
be introduced in the following ways:
1 . External, A dininigtratiye_ In pijit,, Errors
a. Input Document Error
This type of error results from receipt in the
payroll department of documents which contain incorrect
input data. Such documents may contain non-monetary errors
which may escape internal control detection. Examples of
such errors which would have a monetary effect are:
(1) Improper Rank/Rate
(2) Incorrect pay entry base date
(3) Incorrect BAQ status
(il) Incorrect number of leave days
b. Input Do-cument Lost
This type of error results from a lack of
receipt by the payroll department of documents which if
^received would have an impact on the financial statenents.
Examples of such errors are:
(1) Promotion is not reflected
(2) Change in BAQ entitlement not reflected
(3) Change in BAS not reflected
(4) Leave days taken/earned not charged
c. Input Document Not Created
This type of error occurs when the input
document is not created at the appropriate time. Errors of
thi$ type have an effect identical with the input document
U2

lost type error. The input document not created error will
be treated as a subset of the input document lost type
error.
2 • Internal Administrati ve Inpu t Error
a, Completi.gn Of PICA Reguirements
This type of error results when the completion
of payment of the FICA tax obligation is not noted and the
reguired changes made to the pay record.
b, Unrecognized Longevity
I'his type of error results when a step increase
in base pay due to longevJLty ^s not recognized and the
proper adjusting entry made to the pay record.
3- Clerical Errors
Clerical errors can occur any time a person makes an
entry on the pay record. Various types of clerical errors
are as follows :
a. Computatj-onal
This type of error results when a simple
arithmetic error is inade in calculation of an individual's
pay. This can be the 2+2=5 type or the 6 x 2 = 21 type. In
any case, it introduces a monetary error in the financial
statements.
t. Transpositional
This type of error results when a correct figure
is improperly transferred from one document to another
document. Fcr example, $9.85 may be transferred as $9.58,
c, Eecord Close Out
This type of error results in the creation of a
new pay record with ^-lupi^oper initial information included in
the record. Since a pay record is closed out every six
months, this type of error can occur only twice a year.
^ ' N en - Konet 3 r_y Errors
In general, a non-monetary error will not introduce
113

an error into the financial statements. However, the
failure to include an individual pay record or delete a pay
record from the system would result in such misstatenients.
This is a case where a non-monetary error would effect the
financial statements.
B. INIEUTIONAL ERRORS
Since intentional errors are the result of overt action
by clerks operating the system, the number of ,ways errors
can be introduced is almost infinite. In practice, it could
become difficult to determine if, in fact, an error is
intentional. Intentional errors could be disguised as an
unintentional error by the person who is defalcating. Some




Pay ,Eecord ^Modification Errors
Ihis type of error occurs when clerks operating the
system modify a pay record to increase the dollar value
paid. This could be done by the clerk modifying his own pay
record or introducing a bogus record into the system.
During the period of transfer, the pay record is in each
individual's possession. The individual could,, at that
time, modify the pay record in such a manner as to increase
his take horoe pay.
2 Theft _of.^BlaTi k Checks
During the interval between receipt at the ccmmand
of the blank checks and imprinting the payee's name on the
check, there exists the possibility of theft and subsequent
forgery and cashing of the check.
3" Creation of Unauthorized Check
Curing the period when the checks are being created,
a clerk could introduce an unauthorized check. The check
im

would then progress through the system and be collected and
cashed by the clerk upon signing of the check.
C. EVAIDAIICN OF IRREGULARITIES
1,. Irror Haqnit..ude And Frequency
Ihrough discussions with the supervisor and clerks
in the payroll department and by observation of them
performing their dutj.es, an impression of the frequency and
magnitude of the various errors was obtained. The frequency
of the error occurrence used in this simulation has no
statistical basis in fact, rather, it is a subjective
evaluation of the system. The magnitude of the errors was
arrived at in the same manner. A summary of this evaluation
appears on page 28.
2 • Internal, Control Failure Bat e
Using the same technique as above combined with a
study of the written internal control procedures, an
impression was gained of the internal control failure rate.





DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF 3IHULATICN MODEL
The defined logic of the program is as follows (see
figure 12)
:
A. The casic data is read into the computer and the
various constants are established at their initial values,
B. The prograin then steps through six statements to
determine if any of the six defined errors have be^n
committed. These errors are:
1. An error on an input document (Pi)
.
2. Unauthorized tampering with a pa^ record (F2)
.
3. An error developed during the calculation cf pay
due the euplcyee (P3)
.
t. The inclusion or exclusion of a pay record from
the payroll (P4) -
5. An error committed while entering the ancunt of
pay on the check, pay record, and money list during the NCR
machine operation (P5)
.
6. An error due to defalcation (P6) .
Each of the above errors are discussed in Appendix B
(Identification of Errors and Irregularities) . The decision
which determines tlie presence or lack of presence of an
efror is developed by comparing a random real number between
zero and one with the given occurrence rate. If the rumber
exceeds the occurrence rate, then the event the occurrence
rate described did not occur.
C. If an error is detected as described atove, the
program will branch to a control statement. This statement
will determine if the control has failed. If the control
detected the error, the program will return to the main
s-creara. If the control failed, the program will then go to
a routine to calculate the error introduced. The controls
are identified CI thru C6 and are associated with Pi thru
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P6. Each determination of failure or no failure is
developed in a manner identical to that used to determine
the presence of an error. '
D. If an errpr is detected and the control fail;:, an
error is generated. The size and nature of the error is
determined by the cause of the error. The error magnitudes
are generated by the model using the following logic:
1. Error on an input document (Pi) . The error is
assumed to be normally distributed with a mean U1 and a
standard deviation of SI. The output value of this erroc is
developed by calling a number from a normally distributed
set of randctt cumbers (The numbers have a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of one.) Multiplying this number by Si
and adding it to U1 yields the error. Both Si and U1 can be
defiscd by the basic input data.
2. Pay record tampering (P2} . This error is
calculated in a fashion identical to the calculation for
input document ' error except that the variables are defined
as U2 and S2.
3. Pay calculation error (P3) . This error is
calculated slightly different than the above errors. In
this case, a random jiumber between zero and one is obtained.
This number is then compared against a cumulative
probability distribution and a basic pay is selected. The
cumulative probability distribution of the basic paj was
developed from the payroll distribution at the facility that
was modeled. The basic pay, once selected, is multiplied by
0.05 and either added to or subtracted from the error
depending on the sign of a random number from the normal
distribution
.
^. Pay record inclusion/exclusion error (P^) . This
error essentially is the inclusion or exclusion of a pay
record frcm the payroll. PI is the probability that a pay
record is included in the payroll when, in fact, it should
have been excluded. Again, a random number between zero and
one is selected and compared to PI and also a basic pay is
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selected. If the pay is to be included as a result ot the
random number versus PI comparison, the basic pay selected
is added to the error. If, on the other hand, the pay is
excluded, the basic pay is subtracted from the error.
5. NCR machine error {P5) . This error is generated
in a manner identical to Pi and P2.
6. Defalcation (P6) . This error is generated in a
manner identical to Pi and P2 except that if the error is
found to he negative the value is not added to the payroll
error.
E. Each of the above errors are calculated as they
occur. Errors generated by Pi, P3, P4, and P5 are summed
and passed to control C7 (described below) . Errors
generated by P2 and P6 bypass C7 and are added directly to
the total payroll error being accumulated for each payday.
F. Errors PI, P'3, P'^, and P5 will result in an error in
the pay check received by an employee. A determination of
honesty is made b.y comparing a random number to the check
return probability C7. The errors are not added into the
total if the check is returned. If, however, the test
indicates the check is not returned, the sign of the error
is tested. If the error is negative, the value is not added
into the total errot. If the value is positive, the
magnitude of the error is compared with a random value
selected from a normally distributed variate whose mean is
U7 and standard deviation is Si. If the magnitude cf the
error is less than this number, the error is added directly
to the total payroll error.
G. The above description describes the flow of logic
for one check. If the total payroll consists of K checks,
the cycle is repeated until the number of checks is egual to
K. During the processing of checks, a cumulative total is
kept of the error. When the proper number of checks has
been processed, the resulting error is the value used for
that payroll, A number of separate payroll errors are































































































































































1700 CHECKS tAVE BEE»N PROCESSED
















P C U S
DOCUMENT ERROR 0.150000 0.800000 50.00 50.00
RECORD TAMP. ERROR 0.005000 0.500000 200.00 50.00
CALC ERROR 0.100000 0.950000
RECORD IN/OUT ERROR 0.010000 0.950000 0.250000
CLERICAL ERROR 0.100000 0.950000 0.00 100.00
DEFALCATION ERROR 0. 001000 0.800000 2000.00 1000.00
CHECK RETURN ERROR 0.850000 0.00 40.00
PAY DIST- 0.091 0.139 0.185 0.229 0.252 etc.






C PAYROLl COMPUTER SIMULATION MODEL C
C MAIN C
C C
C TWO LIBRARY SUBROUTINES ARE CALLED AS FOLLOWS: C
C 1. SRAND PROVIDES SHUFFLED RANDOM NUMBERS BETWEEN C
C ZERO AND ONE. C
C 2. SNOEM PEOiVIDES SHUFFLED RANDOM NORMAL NUMBERS C
C WITH A MEAN OF ZERO AND A STANDARD DEVIATION C
C OF ONE. C
C THREE SUB-ROUTINES ARE CALLED BY THE MAIN PBOGRAM C
C AS FCILCKS: C
C 1. RAND STORES 1000 RANDOM NUMBERS FROM SRAND FOR C
C USE BY THE MAIN PROGRAM. C
e 2. SAND STORES 1000 NORMALLY DISTRIBUTED RANDOM C
C NUMBERS FDB USE BY THE MAIN PROGESM. C
C 3. BP PROVIDES BASE PAY DATA TO THE MAIN PROGRAM. C
C INPUI DATA IS DEFINED AS FOLLpHS: C
C PI PROBABILITY OF INPUT DOCUMENT ERROR Q
C P2 lEOBABILITY OF RECORD TAMPERING C
C Py PROBABILITY OF RECORD IN/OUT ERROR C
C £3 PROBABILITY OF CALCULATION ERROR C
C P5 PROBABILITY OF CLERICAL ERROR C
C P6 PROBABILITY OF DEFALCATION C
C CI INTERNAL CONTROL RATE FOR PI ERROR C
C C2 INTERNAL CONTROL RATE FOR P2 ERROR C
C C3 INTERNAL CONTROL RATE FOR P3 ERROR C
C CU INTERNAL CONTROL RATE FOR P4 ERROR C
C C5 INTERNAL CONTROL RATE FOR P5 ERROR C
C C6 INTERNAL CONTROL RATE FOR P6 ERROR C
C C7 PROBABILITY OF RETURN OF INCORRECT CHECK C
C U1 MEAN OF INPUT DOCUMENT ERROR C
C U2 MEAN OF RECORD TAMPERING ERROR C
C 05 MEAN OF CLERICAL ERROR C
C U6 MEAN OF DEFALCATION C
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MEAN Of CHECK BETUEN CONTfiOL C
STANDARD DEVIATION OF Ul ' C




SIANDABD DEVIATION OF 05 C
STANDAED DEVIATION OF U6 C
STANDAED DEVIATION OF U7 C
lEOBABILiTY OF INCLOSION OF IMPEOPEE EECOED C
SEED NUMBEE TO STABT THE BANDOM NUMBEB CHAIN C
STOBAGE AEEA FOE BANDOM NUMBEES C
STOEAGE AREA FOE NORHAL BANDOM NUMBERS C
INDEX FOB A STOBAGE ABEA C
INDEX FOR B STOEAGE ABEA C
NUMBER OF CHECKS TO BE PBOCESSED C
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS TO BE DONE C
CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF PAY BATES C
PAY RATES C
COUNTER TO INDICATE NUMBER OF CHECKS PROCESSED C
COUNTER TO INDICATE NUMBER OF ITERATIONS C
TOTAL ERROR ACCUMULATED ON JTH CHECK . C
TOTAL EBROE ACCUMULATED ON JTH BUN C
SUM OF TOTAL ERRORS C
SUM OF TOTAL ERRORS SQUARED C
DUMMY VARIABLE USED FOR RANDOM NUMBER C
CEAN VALUE OF TER C
STANDARD DEVIATION OF XBAE C
C
CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC





































1 BEAE (5,23,END=22) P1,C1,U1,S1
EE-SD (5,23) P2.,C2,U2,S2






















C CHECK TO SEE IF K CHECKS PROCESSED
IF (J.GT.K) GO TO 18
C CHECK TO SEE IF PI ERROR COMMITTED
CALL RAND (X)
IF (X.1E.P1) GO TO 9
C CHECK TC SEE IF P2 ERROR COMMITTED
3 CALL RAND (X)
IF (X.IE.P2) GO TO 10
C CHECK TC SEE IF P3 ERROR COMMITTED
4 CALL RAND (X)
IF (X.IE.P3) GO TO 11
C CHECK TO SEE IF P4 ERROR COMMITTED
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5 CALL BAND (X)
IF (X, IE.pt}) CO TO Mi
C CHECK TO SEE IF P5 ERfiOR COMMITTED
6 CALL RAND (X)
IF (X.IE.P5) 60 TO 16
C CHECK TO SEE IF P6 fEROR COMMITTED
7 CALL BANC (X)
IF (X.IE.P6) GO TO 17
IF (ER.EQ.O) GO TO 8
C CHECK TO SEE IF PA.YCHECK RETURNED
CALL RAND (X)
IF (X.IE.C7) GO TO 8
IF {EB.LI.D7) GO TO 8
CALL SAND (X)
Z=X*S7
IF (ER.GT.Z) GO TO 8
TEE=TEE+ER





C CHECK 10 SEE IF CONTROL WORKS AND CALCULATE SIZE
-C OF A PI ERROR
9 CALL RAND (X)





C CHECK TO SZE IF COilTROL WORKS AND CALCULATE SIZE
C OF A P2 ERROR
10 CALL RAND (X)







C CHECK TO SEE IE CO>NTEOL WORKS AND CALCULATE SIZE
C OF A P3 EBBOB
11 CALL BAND (X/









C CHECK TO SEE IF CGNIROL WGEKS AND CALCULATE SIZE
C OF A pa EBBOB
14 CALL BAND (X)
IF (X.IE.CU) GO TO 6
CALL SE (Y)
CALL BAND (X)





C CHECK TO SEE IF COliTROL WORKS AND CALCULATE SIZE
C OF A F5 EBEOR
16 CALL RAND (X)





C CHECK TO SEE IF CONTROL WORKS AND CALCULATE SIZE
C CF A P6 ERROR
17 CALL RAND (X)
6a

IF (X.1E.C6) GO TO 8
C&LL SAND (X)
DF=X*S6+U6








IF (I.EQ.1) GO TO 19
XEa2=XEAR*XBAR








IF (I.GE.N) GO TO 21
1=1+1
GO TO 2































































• • ,28X,«P',15X,*C«,15X,'U« ,15X,«S')
5X,I4,2 (2X,F10.2))
• «, 'DOCUMENT EBBOE«,4X,2(51(,F10.6)
,
0.2))













, 'D:]pFALCATION EBEOR' , IX, 2 (5X,F1 0. 6) ,
0.2))
12F6.2)
' ', 'CHECK RETURN ERROR' ,20X,F10. 6,
.2))
14)
•1« ,201,'PAYfiOLL SIMULATION MOCEL')
'0' , 10X, 14, 3X, 'CHECKS HAVE BEEN PEOCESSEE')
' ' ,10X, 14, 3X, 'SEPARATE ^UNS HAVE BEEN MADE')
8X,'I' ,8X,'U' ,11X,»S')
'0' ,55X,'DATA')
• •,10X,'PAY DIST. ',4X,12(1X,F6„3)
)
•0' ,50JC,'END THIS RUN')
• •,10X,'PAY RATE' ,4X,12 (1X,F6.1))
END
cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc
C SUBROUTINE RAND C
C THIS SUBROUTINE CALLS AND STORES 1000 RANDOM NUMBERS, C
C COUNTS THE NUMBERS AS USED AND REFILLS THE STORAGE C






COMMON A, B, 10, 11,0,0,1
. DIMENSION A(1000), B(IOOO), C{12), D {12)
E=A(I0)
I0=l0+t
IF (I0.GT.999) GO TO 1
BEIDRN





C SUBROQTINE SAND C
C THIS SUEROUTINE CALLS AND STORES 1000 NORMALLY C
C DISTRIBUTED RANDOM NUMBERS, COUNTS THE NUMBERS USED C
C AND REFIiLS THE STORAGE AREA WHEN 1000 NUMBERS HAVE C





DIMENSION A(1000), fl(IOOO), C(12), D(12)
R=E(I1)
11=11+1
IF (I1.GT.999) GO TO 1
RETURN





C SiJBROUTINE BASE PAY C
C THIS SUBROUTINE PROVIDES BASE PAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH C








DIHENSION A(1000), B(1000), C(12), D (12)
CALL EAND (X)
DO 1 K=1,12
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